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  A proposed Yield Reserve Program designed to compensate farmers for any reduced yields re-
sulting from nitrogen (N) application rates reduced to below recommended rates is evaluated. 
Assuming that farmers currently follow Extension recommendations for applying N, Yield 
Reserve Program participation reduces expected net revenue by $10 to $13/ha. The Yield Re-
serve Program reduces expected net revenue by $17 to $20/ha for farmers who apply N to 
maximize expected net revenue. Farmers’ costs of participation increase with lower probabili-
ties of inadequate rainfall and higher corn prices and decline with higher N prices. The Yield 
Reserve Program can significantly reduce N applications to cropland, which may reduce N 
content of surface waters, but the costs to taxpayers and farmers will depend on how the pro-
gram is implemented. 
 




Agriculture is a major source of nonpoint source 
(NPS) pollution in the United States, “degrading 
60 percent of the impaired river miles and half of 
the impaired lake acreage” (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 2004). Agriculture has also 
been identified as the largest source of nitrogen 
pollution affecting the Chesapeake Bay (Chesa-
peake Bay Foundation 2003). Nitrogen and phos-
phorus nutrients that leave fields as runoff pro-
mote eutrophication and algal blooms, which cre-
ate anoxic conditions damaging to aquatic species 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006). 
  In the Chesapeake Bay Agreement of 1987, 
cooperating states and the District of Columbia 
agreed to reduce nutrient loadings to the Bay by 
40 percent from the 1985 baseline (Chesapeake 
Bay Agreement 1987). As estimated by the Chesa-
peake Bay watershed model, the nutrient loadings 
goals were nearly achieved by 2000, but current 
water quality measurements indicate continued 
peril for the Bay’s living resources such as fish 
and aquatic vegetation (Chesapeake Bay Program 
2002). Recent model simulations indicate that 
only 58 percent of the phosphorus, 41 percent of 
the nitrogen, and 54 percent of the sediment re-
duction goals necessary to ensure sustainability of 
the Bay’s living resources have been achieved 
(Chesapeake Bay Program 2005). The 2010 goals 
of the Chesapeake Bay Program include removal 
of the Bay and its tidal waters from the Clean 
Water Act 303(d) impaired waters list through 
achievement of established Tributary Strategies 
(Chesapeake Bay Program, undated). 
  State and federal programs seek to mitigate 
NPS pollution originating from farms. One type 
of program involves “green payments,” that is, 
paying farmers for adoption of best management 
practices (BMPs) that mitigate pollution (Ri-
baudo, Horan, and Smith 1999). The Conserva-
tion Reserve Program bidding program uses mar-
ket-determined land rental rates to pay farmers a 
fixed rate to remove highly erodible and other 
environmentally sensitive lands from production 
(USDA 1997). The Conservation Security Pro-
gram provides incentive payments for adoption of 
nutrient management planning and applications 
(USDA 2006b). Recently, programs have pro-
vided insurance to farmers who reduce their nu-
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trient applications to levels specified in BMP 
guidelines (USDA 2003, BMP Challenge 2007). 
These programs insure against yield losses re-
sulting from inadequate nutrient applications. 
  Economic analyses of green payment options 
have focused on types of policy instruments and 
methods of targeting policy instruments (Ri-
baudo, Horan, and Smith 1999). Wu et al. (2004) 
found an inelastic acreage response to payments 
for adoption of conservation crop rotations and 
tillage, implying that such programs would not be 
cost-effective in addressing the hypoxia problem 
in the Gulf of Mexico. Zhang, Horan, and Claas-
sen (2003) found that performance-based subsi-
dies to reduce nitrogen runoff are first-best in that 
subsidy rates are optimally differentiated to re-
flect each farm’s delivery of nitrogen loads. How-
ever, targeted nutrient management subsidies, 
which focus directly on reducing nitrogen appli-
cations, produce almost equivalent net returns 
compared to performance subsidies. This result 
implies that altering nitrogen use directly is more 
efficient than altering land use as a method of 
achieving nutrient reduction goals. While the need 
to focus directly on nitrogen (or phosphorus) re-
ductions in order to reduce nutrient pollution is 
becoming clear, there is less certainty as to how 
this reduction can be achieved most cost effec-
tively with green payments, an issue of high im-
portance to policymakers and water quality pro-
gram leaders. Nutrient management programs 
which induce farmers to reduce nutrient applica-
tions to recommended rates can provide “win-
win” opportunities to increase net returns and re-
duce pollution (VanDyke et al. 1999). However, 
nitrogen applications at or below recommended 
rates may still result in nitrogen loss, because the 
crop is not perfectly efficient in removing applied 
nitrogen (Scharf and Alley 1988). 
  Recently an innovative proposal has been made 
to reduce nutrient applications and nutrient pollu-
tion potential by compensating farmers to reduce 
their nitrogen applications below standard rec-
ommendations (Henry A. Wallace Center 2001). 
Such efforts are labeled “yield reserve” because a 
portion of yield production potential is retired just 
as land is retired under the Conservation Reserve 
Program. This proposal, which has yet to be ap-
proved, faces implementation challenges such as 
verification of farmers’ nitrogen applications and 
yields. Nonetheless, interest in the program con-
cept among policymakers remains high (U.S. 
Congress, Senate, 2002a, 2002b). While the pro-
gram has not been defined for all states, an analy-
sis of the program could help policymakers better 
assess costs to taxpayers and farmers as well as to 
assess its potential to reduce environmental dam-
age from nitrogen applications. The purpose of 
this study is to examine effects of a Yield Reserve 
Program on costs to farmers and taxpayers and 
potential reductions in nitrogen applications. This 
study uses existing yield data extrapolated to the 
Virginia coastal plain to analyze costs under three 
scenarios for implementation of a Yield Reserve 
Program: insurance payments, incentive payments, 
and a combined set of insurance and enhanced in-
centive payments. 
 
Costs of Reducing Nitrogen Applications 
 
Farmers’ potential costs of reducing nitrogen (N) 
applications under the Yield Reserve Program are 
based on the opportunity cost of foregone net 
revenues from the N that is not applied. Foregone 
net revenues are calculated from the loss of yield 
and the savings in N and yield-related costs rela-
tive to those that would have been obtained prior 
to the Yield Reserve Program. Assume that a 
farmer’s corn yield (Y) is given by 
 
(1)  (,,) Yf N W S = , 
 
where  N,  W, and S represent N application, 
weather conditions, and site-specific characteris-
tics, respectively. Expected net revenue (NRp) 
above variable costs under the prior N application 
strategy is 
 




p icp i n p
i
EN R p r P Y P N
=
= ⋅⋅ −⋅ ∑ , 
 
where Np is the amount of N applied under the 
prior N application strategy; Ypi is the corn yield 
obtained under the prior application strategy; Pn 
is the price of N; Pc is the price of corn (net of 
harvest, drying, and transportation costs per unit 
of yield); and pri is the probability of the ith 
weather state, which can take on I possible values 
(I is set to 47 in the empirical model described 
below). Other production costs besides N appli-
cation are assumed fixed and invariant regardless 
of whether or not the farmer participates in the 
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) .
program. Under the Yield Reserve Program, a 
farmer’s net revenue is given by 
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where  Yyri represents the yield obtained under 
weather state i and with the N application man-
dated by the Yield Reserve Program, Nyr. As-
suming risk-neutrality, the farmer’s potential cost 
of reducing N applications to comply with the 
Yield Reserve Program is 
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Potential cost of reducing N applications depends 
on corn and N prices, weather event probabilities, 
the prior N application strategy, and the amount 
of N applied under the Yield Reserve Program. 
 
Prior Nitrogen Applications 
 
Farmers’ N applications are affected by their per-
ceptions of yield risk. Several studies have con-
cluded that N is a yield risk-increasing input, with 
N applications for strong risk averters falling by 
an estimated 2 percent (Babcock, Chalfant, and 
Collender 1987), 30 percent (Rosegrant and Rou-
masset 1985), and 80 percent (Lambert 1990) be-
low expected profit-maximizing levels. However, 
these conclusions were based on production func-
tions estimated with experimental yields. Sri-
Ramaratnam et al. (1987) compared farmers’ per-
ceptions of yield risks and N applications with ex-
perimental data. While experimental results showed 
N to be risk-increasing, farmers viewed N as risk-
reducing. Farmers’ subjective yield expectations 
were more optimistic than comparable experi-
mental results. 
  Babcock (1992) examined the effects of uncer-
tain weather and soil N levels on N applications 
using a linear plateau response function. Increas-
ing uncertainty about weather (rainfall) and soil N 
levels led to increased optimal N applications due 
to the asymmetry of losses from non-optimal N 
applications. Babcock (1992) demonstrated that 
with the plateau yield fixed at its mean level, if 
the price of N is less than half of its marginal 
product with N limiting, optimal N rates under 
weather uncertainty will be greater than under 
certainty. Similarly, uncertainty about soil N lev-
els increases optimal N application rates when the 
marginal product of N is more than twice its 
price. While Babcock’s results assume risk-neu-
trality, he noted that risk-aversion is likely to 
have little impact on N applications because, even 
if N is a risk-reducing input, varying N has rela-
tively little impact on yield risk (Babcock 1992, 
Babcock, Chalfant, and Collender 1987). 
  Babcock’s work implies that in many situations 
net revenue losses from sub-optimal N applica-
tions that are lower or higher than the optimum 
level are likely to be asymmetrical, meaning that 
net revenue losses from applying too little N are 
greater than net revenue losses from applying too 
much. Yield risks from weather uncertainty and 
possibly asymmetric losses need to be considered 
in estimating farmers’ potential costs of the Yield 
Reserve Program. Ignoring such loss asymmetry 
may lead to unrealistic projections of potential 
Yield Reserve Program costs and adoption rates 
by farmers. 
  Farmers’ applications of N also may be heavily 
influenced by recommended rates of the Coop-
erative Extension Service, state agencies, crop 
consultants, and other advisors. Recommended 
rates are particularly important under a Yield Re-
serve Program as they are the baseline from 
which a 15 percent reduction in N application is 




We developed an empirical model to estimate 
corn yields and net revenues under a prior N ap-
plication strategy and with N applications con-
strained by the Yield Reserve Program. Expected 
net revenue is set equal to the yield times the 
price of corn, $102/Mg ($2.58/bu), net of trans-
portation, drying, and marketing costs of $7.14/Mg 
($0.18/bu), minus the N application times the 
price of N, $0.62/kg ($0.28/lb). Other costs are 
assumed fixed. Corn and N prices are the five-
year average prices for 2000 to 2004 adjusted to 
2005 dollars (USDA 2006a). Nitrogen response 
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  All of the regressions produced significant 
models except for 2002 TRS-ORG in North Caro-
lina and 2002 Accomack in Virginia. Low rainfall 
in 2002 limited the impact of N fertilizer on yield. 
Three categories of yield responses were deter-
mined for the data. The data from 2003 and 2004 
were used to form the high yield group, because 
these years gave the highest response to N. Aver-
age yield groups were formed based on the 2000 
and 2001 data, and the low yield group was based 
on the 2002 data. 
functions under different rainfall patterns are esti-
mated for N experimental trials in Virginia and 
North Carolina. Probabilities are assigned to sea-
sonal rainfall based on historical weather data. 
Two prior N application strategies are considered: 
(i) N applications to maximize expected net reve-
nues, and (ii) N applications based on recom-
mended rates of the Virginia Cooperative Exten-
sion Service. The Yield Reserve Program N ap-
plication is set at 15 percent below the amount 
recommended by Virginia Cooperative Exten-
sion. Cooperative Extension fertilizer recommen-
dations are often used as the target application 
level in nutrient management programs (Virginia 
Department of Conservation and Recreation 1995). 
Even at these recommended rates, N losses to the 
environment can occur because of crop ineffi-





Historical weather data were used to determine 
the probabilities of weather corresponding to 
high, average, or low yield conditions. Historic 
yields in Eastern Virginia for 47 years (1953–
2004) were regressed against rainfall amounts 
during the growing season and trend. This regres-
sion facilitated grouping historical yields into 
three categories based on rainfall. The probabili-
ties associated with the rainfall categories were 
used to weight yield response curves. The weighted 
yield response curves were used to determine 
optimal N applications and costs of restricting N 
applications based on weather probabilities. 
 
Yield Response Curves 
 
Experimental data representing 15 site years in 
North Carolina and 5 site years in Virginia were 
used to estimate corn yield response to N (Table 
1). The North Carolina sites included the Peanut 
Belt Research Station (Lewiston), Haslin Farms-
Organic Ridge (HSOR), located in Belhaven, 
Haslin Farms-Sandy Ridge (HSSR), also in Bel-
haven, and the Tidewater Research Station (TRS), 
located in Plymouth (Sripada et al. 2005). The 
Virginia data are from locations in Accomack, 
Augusta, and Charles City counties (Phillips 2005). 
  Corn yield data were obtained from the Na-
tional Agricultural Statistics Service from 1958 to 
2004 for 28 counties in the Virginia Coastal Plain 
(USDA 2006a). The study area forms the south-
east portion of the Chesapeake Bay drainage area 
(see Figure 1). Weighted average corn yield data 
were determined by summing the total production 
of corn for each year and dividing by the area 
harvested. Rainfall data were obtained from the 
Southeast Regional Climate Center’s website
1 for 
the corresponding years. Five weather stations 
were chosen based on their location and com-
pleteness of their records over the 47 years of 
corn yields: Williamsburg 2 N, Warsaw 2 N in 
Richmond County, Suffolk Lake Kilby in Suffolk 
City, Richmond WSO Airport in Henrico County, 
and Painter 2 W in Accomack County. In order to 
mitigate spatial variability in rainfall, rainfall data 
from all five weather stations were averaged. 
  The data were analyzed with quadratic linear 
regression and nonlinear regression utilizing the 
Mitscherlich function (Yaron et al. 1973). The 
quadratic and the Mitscherlich equations pro-
duced similar results including R
2 values.  The 
quadratic equation was selected because it is sim-
pler to apply and interpret compared to a non-
linear regression approach, and because the quad-
ratic equations always produced non-zero values 
for all of the parameters, which was not the case 
for all of the Mitscherlich equations. The quad-
ratic function takes the following form: 
 
(5)  , 
2
j Yc N N =α+β −γ  
   
where Ycj equals observed yield, N is applied N, 
N
2 is the square of N, and α, β, and γ are esti-
mated parameters.   
 
1 See http://www.sercc.com/ (accessed July 10, 2006). 
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NORTH CAROLINA SITES 
2000 Lewiston    III  75  0.69  <.0001 7.7779 0.3491 0.0265  0.0033 -3.5E-05 7.0E-06 
2000 HSOR  IV  73  0.43  <.0001 8.1969 0.5391 0.0199  0.0051  -2.2E-05 1.1E-05 
2000 HSSR  II  73  0.45  <.0001 3.6259 0.6103 0.0198  0.0058  -1.8E-05 1.2E-05 
2000 TRS  I  71  0.70  <.0001 1.8951 0.6966 0.0322  0.0064  -2.6E-05 1.3E-05 
2001 HSOR  IV  45  0.72  <.0001 4.8464 0.7729 0.0414  0.0070  -4.8E-05 1.5E-05 
2001 Lewiston    III  48  0.80  <.0001 3.1104 0.5386 0.0378  0.0047 -4.6E-05 9.7E-06 
2001 TRS  I  47  0.38  <.0001 5.4470 0.9116 0.0183  0.0080  -1.5E-05 1.6E-05 
2002 Lewiston    III  99  0.19  <.0001 2.8028 0.3404 0.0127  0.0030 -2.0E-05 5.8E-06 
2002 TRS-ORG  I  59  0.05  0.2459 3.5508 0.2891 0.0043  0.0026 -7.6E-06 5.1E-06 
2003 Lewiston1  I  47  0.64  <.0001 5.2024 0.5533 0.0187  0.0047  -1.4E-05 9.0E-06 
2003 Lewiston2  I  48  0.56  <.0001 5.3655 0.5738 0.0237  0.0050  -2.8E-05 9.6E-06 
2003 Lewiston3  I  48  0.51  <.0001 5.3125 0.6763 0.0222  0.0058  -2.3E-05 1.1E-05 
2003 TRS1  I  48  0.58  <.0001 4.8644 0.5661 0.0252  0.0049  -3.1E-05 9.5E-06 
2003 TRS2  I  48  0.56  <.0001 5.0916 0.5887 0.0286  0.0051  -3.9E-05 9.9E-06 
2003 TRS3  I  48  0.52  <.0001 5.3291 0.5770 0.0218  0.0050  -2.6E-05 9.7E-06 
VIRGINIA SITES 
2002 Accomack  III  10  0.04  0.8637 3.0523 1.3815 0.0090  0.0268 -4.4E-05 1.1E-04 
2003 Accomack  III  12  0.57  0.0226 3.1321 1.3826 0.0749  0.0252 -2.6E-04 9.9E-05 
2004 Accomack  III  15  0.97  <.0001 4.5867 0.3382 0.0596  0.0080 -8.9E-05 3.8E-05 
2004 Augusta  IV  12  0.55  0.0263 9.8227 0.6826 0.0475  0.0219 -1.9E-04 1.4E-04 




  Yields were regressed against a time trend 
(1958 = 1, 2004 = 47) and growing season rain-
fall. The regressors were each individually plotted 
against the response variable. The plots suggested 
that the regressors would have a better fit if the 
square root of time trend and natural logarithms 
of monthly rainfall were used. After the transfor-
mations were completed, a regression was run 
using R-square and the encyclopedic (using all 
combinations of the variables) selection criteria in 
SAS (SAS, undated). The best model, which is 
defined as the model that is most parsimonious, 
has highest R
2, and has all regressors significant, 
is shown below. The variables include the square 
root of year trend (sqrtyear) and natural logarithm 
of rainfall in centimeters for each month (lnmay, 
























Figure 1. Study Area and Chesapeake Bay Watershed in Virginia 
 
 
where yield refers to Mg of corn per hectare and 
coefficient significance levels are shown in pa-
rentheses. 
  Equation (6) was used to derive detrended yields 
corresponding to rainfall conditions for each 
weather year. Based on the application of equa-
tion (6) to the historic rainfall and yield data, the 
lowest yield for 2003 and 2004 (years with good 
growing season rainfall) is 8.3 Mg/ha. The high-
est yield for 2000 and 2001 (years with average 
growing season rainfall) is 7.9 Mg/ha. The aver-
age of these yields, 8.1 Mg/ha, is used as the 
boundary between good and average yields. Simi-
larly, the lowest estimated yield for 2000 and 
2001 is 7.6 Mg/ha. The estimated yield for 2002, 
the year with low experimental yields, is 5.6 
Mg/ha. The average of the 5.6 and 7.6 yields, 6.6 
Mg/ha, is used as the boundary between yields in 
average and poor rainfall years. There were 6 
years that fell into the highest yield group, 23 in 
the average yield group, and 18 in the low yield 
group. The corresponding probabilities of these 
types of years occurring are 13 percent for a good 
(high yield) year, 49 percent for an average (aver-
age yield) year, and 38 percent for a bad (low 
yield) year. 
 
Soil Productivity Groups 
 
The soil on which each experiment was con-
ducted is classified in a Soil Productivity Group 
as defined in the Virginia Nutrient Management 
and Standards Criteria (Criteria) (Virginia De-
partment of Conservation and Recreation 1995). 
The potential yields assigned to each Soil Pro-
ductivity Group in the Criteria were used to apply 
yield response curves from the experiments to 
other soils. An adjustment percentage was calcu-
lated, which equaled the ratio of potential yield 
for each Soil Productivity Group relative to the 
Productivity Group on which the experiment was 
conducted (Table 2). Adjustment percentages were 
multiplied by the linear and quadratic terms in 
each yield response curve to obtain estimated 
yield responses to N for the soil groups not in-
cluded in the field experiments. The intercepts 
were not adjusted because yields on different 
soils in the study area are not expected to vary 
greatly at low levels of fertilizer application. 
  Total areas in Soil Productivity Groups I, II, 
and III in the Virginia Coastal Plain (Table 2) 
were quantified using soil profiles obtained from 
the Soil Data Mart of the Natural Resource Con-
servation Service, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA, undated). The corn acreage in each 
Soil Productivity Group was estimated by multi-
plying its percentage share of the total area in 
groups I, II, and III by the average amount of 
corn acreage for the Virginia Coastal Plain for 
2000–2004 (USDA 2006a). Although the Criteria 
define 5 soil productivity groups, only Soil Pro-
ductivity Groups I, II, and III are included be- 
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Table 2. Soil Productivity Areas in Virginia Coastal Plain and Yield Adjustments 
Soil Productivity Groups 
Estimated Corn Area in 
Virginia Coastal Plain (ha) 




Yield Ratio Relative to Soil 
Productivity Group I (%) 
I 13,300  11.0  100 
II 32,798  9.7 89 
III 40,193  8.5 77 
IV NA  6.9  63 
Source: Soil types and corresponding areas were obtained from USDA (undated). Classifications of soil types into productivity 




cause they account for almost all corn production 




Two prior N application strategies, the first based 
on Cooperative Extension recommendations and 
the second based on expected net revenue maxi-
mization, were considered. Cooperative Exten-
sion recommendations are 196, 174, and 152 kg 
N/ha, respectively, for Groups I, II, and III, based 
on yields shown in Table 2. Cooperative Exten-
sion N fertilizer recommendations are based on 
an efficiency of 0.02 kg N/kg grain (1.0 lb N/bu) 
of corn grain production potential for individual 
soil series (Virginia Department of Conservation 
and Recreation 1995). Yield potential for each 
soil series is established from yield records over 
several years (usually 5) from research and on-
farm trials. Virginia corn yield potential levels for 
individual soils were updated in 2005 (Baker 
2006). The N fertilizer recommendations will 
generally be the rate that will achieve 90 to 95 
percent of maximum yield potential based on 
corn yield response to N fertilization trials. 
  The N application that maximizes net revenue 
on each of k = 3 soil productivity groups is esti-
mated as follows: 
 
(7) 
   , 
20
1
Max ( ) : 1...41 ik ijk ik c jk ik n
j




where prjk is probability of obtaining a yield re-
sponse of Yijk for an application rate of Nik on the 
kth Soil Productivity Group. For the ith N appli-
cation on Soil Productivity Group k there are j = 
20 possible yield responses (depending on weather 
and site conditions) corresponding to the 20 yield 
response equations shown in Table 1 as applied to 
the kth Soil Productivity Group. For a given Soil 
Productivity Group, the composite, weighted-av-
erage yield response function (Figure 2) is ob-
tained by summing the yield response of each 
equation in Table 1 (as applied to that Soil Pro-
ductivity Group) multiplied by its probability. 
The probability of each yield response equation is 
related to growing season rainfall (good rainfall 
probability = 0.13, average rainfall probability = 
0.49, and poor rainfall probability = 0.38) as 
follows. Each yield response estimated for a given 
type of rainfall year is assumed to be equally 
likely. Each of the 10 equations estimated for 
good rainfall years (2003 and 2004) is given a 
probability of 0.13/10 = .013. Each of the 7 equa-
tions estimated for average rainfall years (2000 
and 2001) has a 0.49/7 = 0.07 probability, and 
each of the 3 equations estimated for low rainfall 
years (2002) has a 0.38/3 = 0.127 probability. 
  The expected net revenue maximizing strategy 
is found by searching over 41 potential applica-
tion rates varying in 9 kg/ha (8 lb/ac) increments 
from 0 to 360 kg/ha (320 lbs/ac). Expected net 
revenue maximization occurs at N applications of 
225, 216, and 207 kg/ha for Soil Productivity 
Groups I, II, and III, respectively. 
 
Farmer Compensation and Taxpayer Costs 
 
Farmers’ expected costs of the Yield Reserve 
Program are equal to estimated expected net 
revenue in the baseline using the prior N applica-
tion strategy minus expected net revenue under 
the Yield Reserve Program prior to compensa- 
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Figure 2. Composite Yield Response to Nitrogen Functions by Soil Productivity Group 
 
 
tion. Expected costs may be offset by compensa-
tion. Three compensation scenarios are investi-
gated: insurance-only, incentive-only, and a com-
bined set of insurance and enhanced incentive 
payments. The insurance-only scheme provides 
compensation to the participating farmer during a 
year when yield losses occur due to applying N 
below recommended rates. Losses are compen-
sated at the assumed market price. Losses are cer-
tified by planting check strips in the field, which 
are fertilized at recommended rates. The incen-
tive-only scheme provides the farmer a fixed an-
nual payment equal to the expected value of net 
revenue losses from applying N at a rate 15 per-
cent below the Extension-recommended levels. 
There is no insurance adjustment for yield losses 
under this scheme. The incentive scheme takes 
account of savings realized by a farmer from re-
duced N applications and reduced harvest, trans-
portation, and marketing costs for the lower yield. 
  The combined set of enhanced incentive and 
insurance payments is expected to provide the 
highest overall level of compensation to farmers 
and, therefore, to induce the widest level of par-
ticipation. This option provides an enhanced in-
centive payment of $74 per hectare ($30 per 
acre), which is higher than the expected level of 
the incentive payment under option 1. In addition, 
the program provides an insurance payment, 
which covers yield losses in years when yields 
are reduced due to lower fertilizer rates (Sweeney 
2005). For all three compensation schemes, yield 
losses are calculated relative to the yields that 
would have been earned from applying N at the 
level recommended by Extension. If net revenue 
maximizing N applications are higher than Exten-
sion recommendations, farmers’ losses may be 
higher. 
  Cost of the program to taxpayers under each 
payment scenario (assuming 100 percent farmer 
participation) is estimated by summing farmer in-
centive and insurance payments plus administra-
tive costs times the estimated number of hectares 
of corn produced in the Virginia Coastal Plain. 
Administrative costs for verifying N applications 
and yield losses under the Yield Reserve Program 
are estimated as $7.40/ha (Simpson 2005). 
 




Assuming that farmers currently follow Extension 
recommendations in applying N, the estimated 
cost to farmers of the Yield Reserve Program 
(reduction in expected net revenue) ranges from 
$13 (Soil Group I) to $10 (Soil Group III) per 
hectare (Table 3). Costs are incurred because of 
yield reductions averaging 0.3 Mg/ha. The costs 
are lowered somewhat by savings from reduced N 
applications, which fall by 29, 26, and 23 kg/ha 
on Soil Groups I, II, and III, respectively. Costs 
are higher on higher productivity soil groups be-
cause they have slightly greater yield losses from 
reduced N applications. 
  If current N applications are based on net reve-
nue maximization, farmer costs per hectare of the 
Yield Reserve Program are higher: $17 (Soil 
Group I) to $20 (Group III) (Table 3). Costs are 
higher because the Yield Reserve Program im-
poses larger restrictions on N applications by net 
revenue maximizers. When farmers apply N to 
maximize expected net revenue, N application 
rates are higher compared to Extension recom-
mendations. For example, N application on Soil 
Group I increases from 196 to 225 kg/ha, a 15 
percent increase (Table 3, row 1). The 15 percent 
reduction in N application under the Yield Re-
serve Program is computed based on Extension 
recommendations; consequently, the N application 
on Soil Group I is reduced by 58 kg/ha (com-
pared to a 29 kg/ha reduction for those farmers 
following Extension recommendations). However, 
expected costs of the Yield Reserve Program are 
still not large—the largest cost of $20 for Soil 
Group III is less than 4 percent of baseline ex-
pected net revenue. N applications higher than 
Extension recommendations bring only modest 
yield increases—0.2, 0.3, and 0.4 Mg/ha on Soil 
Groups I, II, and III, respectively—and net reve-
nue increases—$4, $8, and $10/ha, respectively 
(Table 3, rows 2 and 3). Consequently, the reduc-
tions in net revenues from the Yield Reserve Pro-
gram are not much larger (in absolute terms) for 
net revenue maximizers than for those following 
Extension recommendations. 
  Yield reserve compensation and mean net reve-
nue with compensation (Table 4) are the same for 
both N application strategies because N applica-
tions are restricted to the same level, 15 percent 
below Cooperative Extension recommendations. 
The Yield Reserve Program compensation under 
the incentive-only scheme is set equal to the ex-
pected cost of the program with N applications 
restricted to 15 percent below Extension recom-
mendations (Table 4). Incentive-only compensa-
tion of $10 to $13/ha (Table 4) covers only one-
half to three-fourths of the $17 to $20 costs of the 
Yield Reserve Program for net revenue maximiz-
ers (Table 3). Insurance-only compensation ($27 
to $39/ha) is up to three times larger than incen-
tive-only compensation. With insurance, all re-
ductions in yield from the Extension baseline are 
compensated at the market price. Savings from 
reduced N applications and reduced yield trans-
portation costs are not deducted from compensa-
tion paid to farmers as is the case under the in-
centive-only scheme. Compensation under the en-
hanced-incentive plus insurance plan is highest of 
the three plans evaluated, three to four times 
higher than the insurance-only plan (Table 4). 
Compensation includes coverage of yield losses 
relative to yields under the Extension baseline 
plus an enhanced incentive of $74/ha. The $74 
enhanced incentive is larger than expected costs 
of the Yield Reserve Program. 
  After factoring in the Yield Reserve Program 
compensation, expected net revenue per hectare is 
generally larger under the Yield Reserve Program 
compared to the baseline for all soil groups (Ta-
ble 4 versus Table 3). The one exception is incen-
tive-only compensation under the net revenue 
maximizing baseline, for which expected net 
revenues decline by $4 to $10/ha. Farmers seek-
ing to maximize expected net revenues should 
have incentives to participate if their prior prob-
abilities of yield reductions under the Yield Re-




Farmers may tend to forget the bad years and 
overestimate the response of yields to N (Sri-
Ramaratnam et al. 1987, Pease 1992), which would 
increase the perceived costs of the Yield Reserve 
Program. The sensitivity of expected costs of the 
program to perceived yield probabilities is ex-
amined under two additional weather probability 
scenarios. In the first scenario, farmers are as-
sumed to forget all but the most extreme bad 
years. The year 2002 is the most recent drought 
year with poor yields and has the seventh lowest 
predicted yield in the past 47 years based on the 
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Table 3. Effects of Yield Reserve Program Scenarios on Nitrogen Applications, Mean Yields, and 
Mean Farmer Net Revenues 
    Nitrogen Applications Based on ... 














BASELINE            
1. Nitrogen application         kg/ha  196  174  152  225  216  207 
2. Mean yield    Mg/ha  8.0  7.4  6.8  8.2  7.7  7.2 
3. Mean net revenue   $/ha  639  593  550  643  601  560 
COSTS OF REDUCED NITROGEN APPLICATIONS UNDER YIELD RESERVE PROGRAM 
4. Nitrogen application    kg/ha  167  148  129 167 148 129 
5. Mean yield    Mg/ha  7.7  7.1  6.5  7.7  7.1  6.5 
6. Mean net revenue   $/ha  626  582  540  626  582  540 
7. Mean cost (row 3–row 6)  $/ha  13  12  10  17  19  20 
 
 
Table 4. Compensation and Farmer Net Revenue under Yield Reserve Program
a
  Soil Prod. Group I  Soil Prod. Group II  Soil Prod. Group III 
1. Mean net revenue before compensation  626  582  540 
YIELD RESERVE PROGRAM COMPENSATION ($/HA)     
2. Incentive only   13  12  10 
3. Insurance only
b 39 33 27 
4. Enhanced incentive + insurance
c    113 107 101 
MEAN NET REVENUE WITH YIELD RESERVE PROGRAM COMPENSATION ($/HA) 
5. Incentive only (row 1 + row 2)  639  594  550 
6. Insurance only (row 1 + row 3)  665  615  567 
7. Enhanced incentive + insurance (row 1 + row 4)  739  689  641 
a Compensation and net revenues apply to both nitrogen application strategies. 
b Amounts shown are mean payments. Payments vary from 0 to a maximum of $115 (Group I), $98 (Group II), and $81 (Group III).   
c Amounts shown are the mean insurance payment (row 3) plus an enhanced incentive payment of $74/ha (Simpson 2005). 
Payments per hectare vary from a minimum of $74 to a maximum of $189 (Group I), $172 (Group II), and $155 (Group III). 
 
 
trend model [equation (6)]. Predicted yields for 
2002 [equation (6)] are used as the cutoff for low 
yield years. Only years with yields lower than 
those predicted for 2002 are included as low yield 
years, with other years being reclassified as aver-
age years. The resulting probabilities are 72, 15, 
and 13 percent for average, bad, and good years, 
respectively. In the second scenario, farmers are 
assumed to forget all bad years, which are reclas-
sified as average years. Resulting probabilities for 
average and good years are 87 percent and 13 
percent, respectively. In this scenario, equations 
for 2002 in Table 1 are not used in estimating 
yield losses under the Yield Reserve Program. 
  Under scenarios 1 and 2, expected costs of the 
Yield Reserve Program are almost double and 
triple, respectively, compared to cost estimates 
based on initial probabilities (compare Table 5, 
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Table 5. Expected Cost of Participation in the Yield Reserve Program with Reduced Probability 

























BASELINE         
1. Nitrogen application         kg/ha  196  174  152  196  174  152 
2. Expected yield    Mg/ha  9.4  8.6  7.8  10.4  9.4  8.5 
3.  Expected  net  revenue  $/ha 778 713 652 868 790 717 
COSTS OF REDUCED NITROGEN APPLICATIONS UNDER YIELD RESERVE PROGRAM 
4. Nitrogen application  kg/ha  167 148 129 167 148 129 
5. Expected yield    Mg/ha  9.0  8.2  7.5  9.8  9.0  8.1 
6.  Mean  net  revenue  $/ha 752 691 633 834 761 693 
7. Mean cost (row 3–row 6)  $/ha  26  22  19  35  29  24 
a Rainfall year probabilities reclassified as average, 72 percent, low, 15 percent, and good, 13 percent. Nitrogen applications are based 
on Cooperative Extension recommendations. 
b Rainfall year probabilities reclassified as average, 87 percent, and good, 13 percent.   
 
 
scenarios 1 and 2, with Table 3, Extension rec-
ommendations). Costs of the Yield Reserve Pro-
gram are low or even negative in drought years 
because there is little or no crop response to N 
and farmers save money by applying less N. 
Lowering the probability of drought years re-
duces this advantage of the Yield Reserve Pro-
gram and increases the expected cost. However, 
under both scenarios, expected costs are only 3–4 
percent of baseline expected net revenues. 
  Increases in the cost of N would lower costs of 
the Yield Reserve Program as farmers save more 
money from lowering their N applications. A 
Sensitivity Index [percentage change in net cost/ 
percentage change in N price (corn price)] was 
formulated to examine the response of farmer net 
cost to changes in N or corn prices. A 25 percent 
increase in the price of N (to $0.77/kg) lowers the 
expected cost of the Yield Reserve Program by 
$5, $4, and $3 on Soil Groups I, II, and III, re-
spectively (Table 6). The Sensitivity Index is 
greater than 1 in absolute value, indicating sen-
sitivity of the Yield Reserve Program costs to N 
price. 
 Increased  corn  prices  raise the value of yield 
losses from lowering N applications and increase 
the costs of the Yield Reserve Program. The Sen-
sitivity Index for corn price (percentage change in 
net cost/percentage change in corn price) is 
greater than two for all soil groups, indicating that 
a 25 percent increase in corn price raises expected 
cost of the Yield Reserve Program by more than 




Taxpayer costs of the Yield Reserve Program in 
the Virginia Coastal Plain vary significantly by 
compensation scheme. The lowest cost plan is 
incentive-only with a total cost of approximately 
$1.6 million (Table 7). Costs are low because 
savings from reduced N and crop transportation 
costs are accounted for and reduce the amount of 
payment. Based on the estimates presented here, 
farmers following Extension recommendations 
would just break even with no additional com-
pensation for bearing risk. The insurance plan 
would be twice as expensive as the incentive-only 
plan because farmers are compensated for yield 
losses, while savings from reduced N and reduced 
crop harvest costs are not deducted from farmers’ 
compensation. The cost of the proposed enhanced 
 208    October 2007  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
Table 6. Effects of Increased Nitrogen and Corn Prices on Farmer Net Costs of Yield Reserve
a
  Mean Net Costs of Yield Reserve
b
  Soil Group I  Soil Group II  Soil Group III 
Base  scenario  13 12 10 
Nitrogen price = $0.77/kg  8  8  7 
Sensitivity index
c -1.5 -1.3 -1.2 
Corn price = $128/Mg  21  19  17 
Sensitivity index
c 2.5 2.3 2.8 
a Nitrogen and corn prices in the base scenario are $0.62/kg and $102/Mg, respectively. 
b Nitrogen applications are based on Cooperative Extension recommendations. 
c Sensitivity index = percentage increase in farmer net cost/percentage increase in Nitrogen (corn) price. 
 
 
Table 7. Reduced Nitrogen Applications and Mean Taxpayer Costs of Yield Reserve 
  Soil Group I  Soil Group 
II 
Soil Group III  Total 
RESIDUAL NITROGEN REDUCTIONS (KG)      
Extension recommendation baseline  321,823  702,360  751,539  1,775,722 
Maximum revenue baseline  658,021  1,894,917  2,663,981  5,216,919 
TAXPAYER COSTS ($)        
Incentive only       
 Total  cost  $266,000  $623,162  $723,474  $1,612,636 
  Cost/ha  $20   $19   $18   $19 
  Cost/kg residual N reduction (Extension baseline)  $0.83  $0.89  $0.96  $0.91 
  Cost/kg residual N reduction (maximum revenue baseline)  $0.40  $0.33  $0.27  $0.31 
Insurance only        
  Total cost   $611,800  $1,311,920  $1,406,755  $3,330,475 
  Cost/ha  $46   $40   $35   $39 
  Cost/kg residual N reduction (Extension baseline)  $1.90  $1.87  $1.87  $1.88 
  Cost/kg residual N reduction (maximum revenue baseline)  $0.93  $0.69  $0.53  $0.64 
Enhanced incentive + insurance        
 Total  cost  $1,596,000  $3,738,972  $4,381,037  $9,716,009 
  Cost/ha  $120   $114   $109   $113 
  Cost/kg residual N reduction (Extension baseline)  $4.96  $5.32  $5.83  $5.47 
  Cost/kg residual N reduction (maximum revenue baseline)  $2.43  $1.97  $1.64  $1.86 
a Costs are mean values for the Virginia Coastal Plain assuming 100 percent participation on corn acres. Costs include farmer compen-
sation plus a $7.40/ha administrative cost. 
 
 
incentive plus insurance plan, $9.7 million, is six 
times more expensive than the incentive-only plan, 
because it includes an insurance payment plus an 
enhanced incentive payment, $74/ha, which is 
higher than the estimated expected cost of the 
Yield Reserve Program to farmers. 
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  McCann and Easter (2000) estimate an average 
transaction cost of $30.94/ha for all agricultural 
conservation programs, which is almost four times 
higher than the $7.40 rate used in this study. If 
the $30.94 rate were used, taxpayer costs would 
increase to $3.6, $5.4, and $11.8 million, respec-
tively, for incentive, insurance, and enhanced-in-
centive plus insurance compensation schemes. 
  Yield Reserve Program costs per kg of N re-
duction depend on how N reductions are defined 
and the baseline from which reductions are meas-
ured. Here, N reductions are defined as reductions 
in residual N, which is defined as the amount of 
applied N not removed by the crop. Crop removal 
is estimated as crop yield for the given N 
application amount (Table 3) times N removal per 
unit of yield. Corn removes an estimated 16.1 kg 
N per Mg of grain harvested (Virginia Coopera-
tive Extension Service 2000). 
  Bosch et al. (1992) conducted a survey of farm-
ers’ nutrient application practices in a portion of 
the study area. They concluded that most sur-
veyed farmers applied close to Extension-recom-
mended levels of N. If this finding holds gener-
ally true in the study area, total residual N reduc-
tions are an estimated 1.8 million kg, and costs 
per kg of N reduction are $0.91, $1.88, and $5.47 
per kg, respectively, for incentive-only, insur-
ance-only, and enhanced-incentive plus insurance 
plans (Table 7). If farmers apply N to maximize 
expected net revenue, the estimated reduction is 
almost 3 times larger, 5.2 million kg. Compared 
to the Extension baseline, estimated costs per kg 
of residual N reduction are one-third as high—
$0.31, $0.64, and $1.86 per kg, respectively, for 
incentive-only, insurance-only, and enhanced-in-
centive plus insurance plans. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Policymakers are searching for ways to reduce 
nonpoint source pollution from farms. A Yield 
Reserve Program proposal would compensate 
farmers for reducing N applications by 15 percent 
below Extension recommendations. This study 
analyzes the policy proposal for the Virginia 
Coastal Plain under three compensation plans: 
incentive-only, insurance-only, and enhanced-in-
centive plus insurance. 
  Assuming that farmers follow Extension rec-
ommendations in applying N, expected costs of 
the Yield Reserve Program (reductions in ex-
pected net revenue from limiting N applications) 
are $10 to $13/ha or 3 to 4 percent of baseline ex-
pected net revenue. Costs are somewhat higher 
for farms that apply N to maximize expected net 
revenue, $17 to $20/ha, but still less than 4 per-
cent of expected net revenue. Reducing the prob-
ability of low rainfall years increases the expected 
cost of the Yield Reserve Program because yield 
penalties from limiting N applications are highest 
under average to good rainfall years. However, 
even with all low rainfall years removed, costs 
are $35/ha or less. Yield Reserve Program costs 
are sensitive to N and corn prices. Increasing the 
N price lowers program costs because farmers 
save more money from the lower N applications. 
Increased corn prices increase program costs be-
cause of the higher value of yield losses from 
lower N applications. 
  Taxpayer costs would be lowest under the in-
centive-only plan, which limits compensation to 
expected costs of Yield Reserve Program partici-
pation. Insurance-only and enhanced-incentive 
plus insurance plans would have higher costs due 
to higher compensation paid to farmers and costs 
of administration. The taxpayer cost per kg re-
duction in residual N is sensitive to the incentive 
scheme and the assumed N application in the 
baseline prior to the Yield Reserve Program. If 
farmers follow Extension recommendations, av-
erage costs per kg reduction in residual N vary 
from $0.91 to $5.47/kg, depending on compensa-
tion. 
  The Yield Reserve Program can potentially 
reduce nutrient pollution in waterways. The level 
of farmer participation and costs to taxpayers and 
farmers will depend on how the program is im-
plemented. Whether the Yield Reserve Program 
is implemented and at what level will depend on 
perceived benefits of nutrient reduction, costs of 
alternative programs for reducing nutrient pollu-
tion, and other factors. Several issues related to 
the economic viability of yield reserve for nutri-
ent pollution control require further study, in-
cluding the following. 
 
  Transaction costs. McCann and Easter (2000) 
estimate that transaction costs are 38 percent of 
total conservation program costs. The transaction 
costs of yield reserve and other approaches to 
reducing nutrient pollution should be compared. 
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A yield reserve program may offer opportunities 
to economize on overall transaction costs by ob-
taining larger individual reductions in N applica-
tions per contracting farmer compared to the N 
reductions obtained in a standard nutrient man-
agement program. 
 
 Program  targeting. Targeting program payments 
at farmers with lowest costs per unit of pollution 
reduction may greatly reduce costs of achieving 
nutrient control objectives (Carpentier, Bosch, and 
Batie 1998, Zhang, Horan, and Claassen 2003). 
The potential to enhance the cost-effectiveness of 
yield reserve by targeting payments should be 
investigated. This study would require the use of 
site-specific models that link reductions in N 
applications to changes in N loadings to water 
bodies (Ribaudo et al. 2001). 
 
  How frequently must nitrogen recommenda-
tions be updated? The Yield Reserve Program 
targets a 15 percent reduction in fertilizer appli-
cations from Extension-recommended levels. If 
new hybrids of corn have a greater yield response 
to N, and the optimal (net revenue maximizing) 
levels of fertilization increase without the Exten-
sion recommendations also increasing, the pro-
gram’s costs to farmers could increase. In Vir-
ginia there were approximately 10 years between 
the most recent updates in Extension fertilizer ap-
plication recommendations (1995 to 2005). 
 
  Sensitivity of farmer participation to recent 
weather. The effect of recent weather on farmers’ 
perceived yield risk and perceived costs of the 
Yield Reserve Program deserves more study. 
Changes in farmers’ subjective yield probabilities 
as a result of recent weather experiences could 
change their perceived costs of program partici-
pation and willingness to participate under alter-
native compensation rules. 
 
  Other production costs. The Yield Reserve 
Program could affect other crop production costs 
besides N application. For example, with land 
area held constant, lower yields  raise farmers’ 
machinery costs and land rent costs per unit of 
yield. Because land and machinery costs are vari-
able in the long run, farmers’ costs of participa-
tion could rise as these costs are spread over 
lower yields. Higher land and machinery costs 
may discourage participation in some cases. 
These costs should be estimated to determine if 
they present significant barriers to participation. 
 
  Government subsidy payments. Farmers whose 
yields decline as a result of the Yield Reserve 
Program will also get lower loan deficiency pay-
ments when prices fall below the loan rate. This 
potential disincentive should be quantified. 
 
  Residual nitrogen effects. The potential effects 
of drawing down soil residual N levels on Yield 
Reserve Program participation and costs should 
be examined further. There is evidence of high 
levels of residual N in many crop fields (Brown 
1996, Yadav, Peterson, and Easter 1997). Reduc-
tions in yields from reduced N applications may 
increase over time in such fields, thus increasing 
farmers’ participation costs and perhaps the com-
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